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In July 2013 the government introduced fees to be payable by claimants for cases taken to an 
Employment Tribunal (ET) and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT).  The main justification for 
introducing fees to the previously free service was to pass on costs to the users of those services.  
However, the trade union UNISON (amongst others) considered fees to constitute a barrier to 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ͛ access to justice.  This case represents hE/^KE͛Ɛ third judicial review proceeding 
challenging the validity of these fees.  At issue was whether the fees imposed by the Lord Chancellor 





By virtue of section 42(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the Lord Chancellor 
has a statutory right to order fees to be payable in ETs and the EAT.1  This right was put into effect by 
way of the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013 (the Fees 
Order),2 which came into force on 29 July 2013.  The Fees Order made an ͚ŝƐƐƵĞ ĨĞĞ͛ and a ͚ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ 
ĨĞĞ͛ payable in respect of any claim presented to an ET and any appeal to the EAT.  The total amount 
payable to have a case heard in an ET was set at £390 or £1,200, depending on whether it was a 
Type A or Type B claim.  A distinction was made based on the nature of the claim; in particular its 
complexity and the associated time and resources it required of ETs.  The total amount payable to 
have a case heard in the EAT was £1,600.  Full and partial remission was available to eligible 
                                                 
*Law School, University of Strathclyde 
1 This provides that the Lord Chancellor may by order prescribe fees payable in anything dealt with by a First-
tier, Upper or ͚ĂĚĚĞĚ͛ tribunal.  Section 42(3) defines an ͚ĂĚĚĞĚ ƚƌŝďƵŶĂů͛ as a tribunal specified in an order 
made by the Lord Chancellor.  The ET and EAT where specified as such by the Added Tribunals (Employment 
Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal) Order 2013 (SI 2013/1892).  
2 SI 2013/1893. 
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claimants.3  Further, the Fees Order provided that a fee may be remitted by the Lord Chancellor in 
exceptional circumstances.4 
 
The first suggestion that fees would be payable for employment disputes emerged in the Beecroft 
Report published in 2012.5  This report reviewed employment laws and regulation with the intention 
of bringing about a reduction in the government deficit through economic growth.  It recommended 
steps aimed at reducing the number of claims being made to ETs, including the introduction of fees.6  
This fitted well with the Coalition ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ neo-liberal agenda and its efforts to eliminate ͚ƌĞĚ 
ƚĂƉĞ͛ for business.7  
 
The introduction of fees, then, was justified on the basis that the fees would transfer some of the 
cost burden from general taxpayers to the users of ETs.8  In the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ cost benefit analysis, 
the assumption was made that ͞d and EAT use does not lead to gains to society that exceed the 
sum of the gains to consumers and producers of these services.͟9  Further, it was claimed that the 
fees would incentivise earlier settlements and dis-incentivise the pursuing of weak and vexatious 
claims.   
 
Distinct changes in ET claimant behaviour emerged after the Fees Order.  There was a long-term 
reduction in claims accepted by ETs in the order of 66-70% from the pre-fee figures.10  The reduction 
was most notable with respect to claims of low value or where a financial remedy was not sought.11  
The proportion of claimants receiving remission was lower than anticipated12 and the Lord 
ŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ͛Ɛ discretionary power to remit fees in exceptional circumstances was exercised rarely.13  
A survey undertaken by Acas (the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service) found that 
                                                 
3 Provided by Article 17 and Schedule 3 of the Fees Order, and substituted by the Courts and Tribunals Fee 
Remissions Order 2013 (SI 2013/2302). 
4 Paragraph 16, Schedule 3 of the Fees Order. 
5 Adrian Beecroft, Report on Employment Law, (24 October 2011,12/825), 7-8, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31583/12-825-report-on-
employment-law-beecroft.pdf [Accessed 26 September 2017]. 
6 Ibid., 8. 
7 ͚dŚĞ Red Tape Challenge: Employment >Ăǁ͛ at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150522175321/http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/themehome/employment-related-law/ [Accessed 8 September 2017. 
8 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and the Tribunals Service, Resolving Workplace Disputes: A 
Consultation (January 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31435/11-511-resolving-
workplace-disputes-consultation.pdf [Accessed 8 September 2017].  See also Ministry of Justice, Charging Fees 
in Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (14 December 2011, Consultation Paper 
CP22/2011), https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-
2011/supporting_documents/chargingfeesinetandeat1.pdf [Accessed 8 September 2017]. 
9Impact Assessment, prepared on behalf of the Ministry of Justice (IA No. TS 007, 30 May 2012), 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-2011/results/et-fees-
response-ia.pdf, paragraph 4.88, footnote 50 [Accessed 8 September 2017]. 
10 R v Lord Chancellor [2017], paragraphs 38 and 39. 
11 Ibid., paragraphs 40 and 41. 
12 As per the Impact Assessment, n. 6. 
13 This was done 31 times during the period 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 (during which period 86,130 individual 
claims were presented), R v Lord Chancellor [2017], paragraph 44. 
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claimants who were unable to resolve employment disputes through conciliation but who did not go 
on to issue ET proceedings were put off doing so by fees.14  More than two-thirds of these survey 
respondents stated that they could not afford the fees, while others reported that the fees were 
more than they were prepared to pay or that the value of the fee equalled the money they were 





The court held in favour of the appellant on the basis that the Fees Order was an unlawful exercise 
of the Lord ŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ͛Ɛ powers under section 42(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
2007 because the prescribed fees interfered unjustifiably with the right of access to justice under 
common law and EU law.  Lord Reed provided the unanimous judgment.  Lady Hale provided an 
addendum regarding discrimination issues in which she determined that the higher charge for Type 
B claims indirectly discriminated against women.   
 
Earlier challenges to the legality of the Fees Order brought by UNISON were argued primarily on the 
basis that it violated the EU principle of effectiveness.  The High Court concluded that breaching this 
principle required the fees to be so high that a prospective litigant was clearly unable to pay them.15  
The Court of Appeal considered that interference with the principle required that it be impossible in 
practice to access the tribunal because it is unaffordable.16  The lower courts dismissed hE/^KE͛Ɛ 
claims. 
 
The court in the present case took a somewhat different approach to the issue of access to justice.  
It observed: ͞ĞĨŽƌĞ this court, it has been recognised that the right of access to justice is not an 
idea recently imported from the continent of Europe, but has long been deeply embedded in our 
constitutional ůĂǁ͘͟17  As such, arguments were primarily made on the basis of this common law 
right.   
 
The court spent time highlighting the importance of the constitutional right of access to justice to 
courts and tribunals.  It observed that the constitutional right played a critical role in maintaining the 
rule of law, including ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in 
accordance with those laws.18  The constitutional right was also noted to have benefits beyond the 
immediate parties to society as a whole by establishing principles of general importance that 
influence the actions of many.19    
 
                                                 
14 Acas, Evaluation of Acas Early Conciliation 2015 (Research Paper 04/15), 
http://m.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/5/4/Evaluation-of-Acas-Early-Conciliation-2015.pdf [Accessed 8 September 
2017]. 
15 Unison, R (on the application of) v The Lord Chancellor & Anor [2014] EWHC 218 (Admin); [2014] ICR 498; 
Unison (No 2), R (on the application of) v The Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin); [2015] ICR 390. 
16 Unison, R (On the Application Of) v The Lord Chancellor [2015] EWCA Civ 935; [2016] ICR 1. 
17 Paragraph 64. 
18 Paragraph 68. 
19 Paragraphs 69-73. 
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Moreover, the court emphasised the long history of the constitutional right of access to the courts in 
English law.  Reference was made to the Magna Carta of 1215Ͷ͞We will sell to no man, we will not 
deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right͟20Ͷthe writing of Sir Edward Coke in the 1620s,21 
and Blackstone in the 1760s.22  More recent authority was noted23 that affirmed the need for clear 
statutory enactment to limit or hinder the constitutional right.24   Further, any such statutory 
enactment can only intrude on the right as is reasonably necessary to fulfil the objective of the 
provision in question.25  In R v Lord Chancellor, Ex p Whitham,26 it was held that there were implied 
limitations upon the Lord ŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ͛Ɛ discretion regarding court fees that did not ͞ƉĞƌŵŝƚ him to 
exercise the power in such a way as to deprive the citizen of what has been called his constitutional 
right of access to the ĐŽƵƌƚƐ͘͟27  Moreover, in R (Hillingdon London Borough Council) v Lord 
Chancellor (Law Society intervening),28 it was observed that the lawfulness of the fees order in 
question depended on ͞ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ there was a real risk that the increase in fees will cause [the 
claimantsͶin this case local authorities] not to make applications which objectively should be 
ŵĂĚĞ͘͟29 
 
In the present case, the court concluded that the Fees Order prevented some persons from having 
access to justice.  To be lawful, the fees needed to be set at a level that everyone can afford, taking 
into account the availability of fee remission.30  Applying Hillingdon,31 the court determined that it is 
sufficient if a real risk that people cannot afford to make employment claims is demonstrated.  The 
sharp and sustained drop in the volume of cases taken to ETs was considered evidence of this.  The 
court rejected the Lord ŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ͛Ɛ argument that people could afford fees if they reduced other 
areas of non-essential spending.32  It reiterated that fees must be reasonably afforded and not 
simply hypothetically afforded.  The court also observed that the fees can render it futile or 
irrational to bring a claim.33  Evidence provided of the steep drop in low value and non-monetary 
claims, together with evidence of the difficulty in receiving full payment of claims awarded, 
supported this conclusion. 
 
                                                 
20 Chapter 40, which remains in on the statue book in chapter 29 of the version issue by Edward I in 1297 
(referred to at paragraph 74). 
21 Refer part 2 of the Institutes of the Laws of England, published posthumously in 1642 (referred to at 
paragraph 75). 
22 Refer Book I, Chapter 1, ͚ďƐŽůƵƚĞ Rights of /ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ͕͛ 1765-1769 (referred to at paragraph 75). 
23 Paragraphs 76-79. 
24 Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273, 310 and Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und 
Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp Ltd [1981] AC 909, 977; Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1; and R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Anderson [1984] QB 778. 
25 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Leech [1994] QB 198; R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex p Simm [2000] 2 AC 115; and R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2001] UKHL 26; [2001]2 AC 532 (referred to at paragraphs 80-82). 
26 [1998] QB 575. 
27 [1998] QB 575, 580. 
28 [2008] EWHC 2683 (Admin); [2009] 1 FLR 39. 
29 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
30 Paragraph 91. 
31 [2008] EWHC 2683 (Admin); [2009] 1 FLR 39. 
32 Paragraph 93. 
33 Paragraph 96. 
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Further, applying Daly,34 the court rejected the claim that the Fees Order could be justified as a 
necessary intrusion on the right of access to justice.  The court noted that the fees did meet the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ primary aim of transferring of the cost burden to users of the system to a limited 
degree.35  However, it considered that it did not follow that fees which intruded to a lesser extent 
upon the right of access to justice would have been any less effective in meeting this aim.36  The 
secondary aims of incentivising earlier settlements of employment disputes and dis-incentivising 
weak and vexatious claims were not supported by evidence.37 
 
The court then went on to consider the rights enforceable in ETs that have their source in EU law.  It 
conceptualised the EU principle of effectiveness somewhat differently from the lower courts stating 
the relevant question to be ͞ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ the limitation of the right to an effective remedy resulting 
from the Fees Order respects the essence of that right and is a proportionate means of achieving the 
legitimate aims pursued, or has a led to an excessive burden being placed on individuals who seek to 
enforce their ƌŝŐŚƚƐ͘͟38  Given the above reasoning by the court that the fees are unaffordable by 
some people and are so high as to prevent claims for small amounts or non-monetary claims, it was 
concluded that the Fees Order imposes limitations on the exercise of EU rights that are 
disproportionate.  As such, the Fees Order is unlawful under EU law.  
 
Lady Hale considered whether the higher fees payable for Type B claims was indirectly 
discriminatory against women because more women bring these claims.  The Court of Appeal had 
accepted that there was a disparate impact on women.  However, it considered this to be justifiable 
under subsection 19(2)(d) of the Equality Act 2010 on the basis that it was legitimate to charge more 
for what was assumed to be a more costly service.39  Lady Hale took a different approach to this 
subsection identifying the relevant question to be ͞whether charging of higher fees for Type B claims 
is consistent with the aims of the Fees Order as a whole.͟40  Here, of course, she was referring to the 
transferring of costs to users of ETs, encouraging earlier settlements, and deterring unmeritorious 
claims.  Lady Hale noted, referring to the findings of Lord Reed, that it had not been shown that the 
higher fee charged for Type B claims was more effective in transferring the cost of the service from 






This case represents a hugely important decision that affirms the necessity of adequate of access to 
justice.  The judicial reasoning articulated is something of a master class in the constitutional right of 
access to the courts that has emerged over centuries of development in the common law.  The 
                                                 
34 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
35 Paragraphs 56 and 99. 
36 Paragraph 100. 
37 Paragraphs 57-90 and 101. 
38 Paragraph 116. 
39 Paragraph 127. 
40 Paragraph 128. 
41 Paragraph 130. 
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judgment is timely as it comes after years of government austerity measures that have placed a 
myriad of pressures on the practical effectiveness of seeking redress in the courts and tribunals, 
especially for the vulnerable in society.42   
 
The relevance of these lessons are particularly important when it comes to employment disputes.  
The neo-liberal political agenda of recent decades has seen a framing of workers͛ pursuance of 
employment claims as variously: a drag on businesses͛ ability to grow and prosper;43 a burden on 
ƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƐ͛ money;44 and a means for workers to unjustifiably cause difficulties for employers.45  
Moreover, an individualised perspective of employment disputes has become the norm.  Such an 
approach fails to recognise the broad inequalities of bargaining power that exist between employers 
and workers and how effective legal redress for employment issues is vital for all workers.46  The 
ĐŽƵƌƚ͛Ɛ judgement redresses some of the political rhetoric and practices that have threatened access 
to justice in employment disputes.  Importantly, it does so in a way that rises above ideological 
agendas and instead reminds us of the broader issues at stake when access to courts and tribunals 
are compromised.   
 
The way in which the judgment relied almost entirely on the common law, with EU law framed as 
reaffirming the long held position in England, is also important.  The h<͛Ɛ pending departure from 
the EU will not alter the strength of the arguments made with respect to the constitutional right of 
access to the courts. 
 
Some immediate issues arise from the fact that the court made the Fees Order unlawful from the 
date that it was made.  These concern the reimbursement of fees already paid and those claims that 
were rejected or dismissed for non-payment of fees.  The President of Employment Tribunals 
(Scotland) made a Case Management Order to the effect that these matters will be dealt with 
shortly in accordance with administrative arrangements to be announced by the Ministry of Justice 
and Her DĂũĞƐƚǇ͛Ɛ Courts and Tribunals Service.47  Would-be claimants who decided not to pursue 
claims because of fees appear less likely to have recourse for the lost opportunity of making a claim.   
 
                                                 
42 E. Palmer, T. Corford, A. Guinchard and Y. Marique (eds), Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of 
Austerity (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2016). 
43 L. Dickens, ͞Fairer Workplaces: Making Employment Rights ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ͟ in Making Employment Rights 
Effective: Issues of Enforcement and Compliance, ed. L. Dickens (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 
44 For example, the statement by Justice Minister Shailesh Vara (28th July 2014) that it is not right that 
͞hardworking taxpayers should pick up the bill for employment disputes in tribunals͟ and that ͞It is reasonable 
to expect people to pay towards the £74m bill taxpayers' face for providing the service͘͟  
45 Business Secretary Vince Cable spoke about ͞a widespread feeling it is too easy to make unmerited ĐůĂŝŵƐ͟ 
(November 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/reforming-employment-relations [Accessed 28 
September 2017]. 
46 N. Busby and M. McDermont, ͞ĐĐĞƐƐ to Justice in the Employment Tribunal: Private Disputes or Public 
Concerns͟ in Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity (E. Palmer, T. Corford, A. Guinchard 
and Y. Marique, eds) (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2016) 
47 Employment Tribunals (Scotland), Case Management Order of the President (No. 2), (18 August 2017) 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/case-management-order-no-131-president-
employment-tribunals-scotland-re-unison-2-20170818.pdf [Accessed 11 October 2017)  
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There remains, of course, the risk that fees may again be introduced for claims made to ETs and the 
EAT.48  The judgment recognised that the government aims underpinning the Fees Order were 
legitimate.49  The Lord Chancellor could apply the lessons from the judgment in any revised effort to 
introduce fees.  However, Scotland may remain exempt from this.  The Scottish government has 
made a public statement against ET fees.50  It pledged to abolish fees once ETs have been devolved, 






                                                 
48 See also D. Robertson, ͚WƌŝĐĞ out of :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ͕͛ The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland (19 September 2017), 
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/62-9/1023757.aspx [Accessed 11 October 2017].  
49 Paragraph 86. 
50 The Scottish Government, A Stronger Scotland: The 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ Programme for Scotland 2015-16 
(September 2015), https://beta.gov.scot/publications/programme-government-2015-16/ [Accessed 26 
September 2017]. 
51 Ibid., 3. 
